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final judgment under these circumstances. Curtiss-Wright then
petitioned to the United States Supreme Court for certiorari.

thus in apparent disagreement on the proper interpretation of the
rule.

Background and Significance

Arguments

FRCP 54(b) is designed to permit a district judge to direct entry
of final judgment in a portion of a case when there is "no just
reason for delay." Entry of final judgment under FRCP 54(b) accomplishes two things: it gives to the prevailing party the fruits of
his partial victory without waiting for the conclusion of the entire
lawsuit; and it establishes clearly a time within which this portion
of the lawsuit must be appealed. In effect, it permits the district
judge, within the limits of the rule, to decide when the interests of
justice and judicial efficiency will be served by the early entry of
final judgment. The United States Supreme Court last dealt with
FRCP 54(b) in a pair of cases decided 23 years ago.
Curtiss-Wright wants entry of final judgment under FRCP
54(b) because it will be able to collect almost $19 million without
waiting and to invest that amount at today's high interest rates. If
Curtiss-Wright is forced to wait until the end of the entire lawsuit
before receiving the $19 million, it will collect interest from GE
during the intervening period at the statutorily-established rate of
only 6 per cent. Since there is a huge disparity between the statutory interest rate and the present rate on the open market, CurtissWright stands to lose about $1 million per year in interest if no
final judgment is entered now.
In a case with similar facts, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit recently decided that the entry of final judgment under
FRCP 54(b) was appropriate. The Third and Tenth Circuits are

For Petitioner, Curtiss-Wright:

CECIL D. ANDRUS, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
v. STATE OF IDAHO et al.
(Docket No. 79-260)
Federal public lands - Statutory interpretation - Extent of
state interest in public lands created by federal desert-land reclamation statute
On Writ of Certiorarito the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. Decision below: not yet reported. Opinion of
District Court, 417 F. Supp. 873 (1976). Argument set for the
week of February25, 1980
Analysis prepared on January 6, 1980, by Patrick Charles
McGinley, Associate Professorof Law, West Virginia University,
College of Law, Morgantown, WV 26505; telephone (304)
293-5301
Issue
Whether the Carey Act ("Act") requires the Secretary of the
Interior to indefinitely reserve from appropriation for other public or private uses approximately 2.4 million acres of desert land in
Idaho subject to the State's eventual selection of any or all of that
acreage for irrigation and reclamation pursuant to the Act.
Facts
The Carey Act passed by Congress in 1894, 43 U.S.C. section
641, provided a statutory mechanism for the transfer of several
million acres of federally-owned desert lands to certain western
states in which these lands are situated. The states are required by
the Act to irrigate, reclaim, cultivate, and settle these lands before
title may pass from the federal government. Congress made up to
three million acres of federal desert land in Idaho available to the

1. FRCP 54(b) expressly contemplates that entry of final judgment may be made when there are counterclaims remaining to be
decided.
2. The district judge properly exercised his discretion under
FRCP 54(b) on a number of grounds, including the separability
of the issues involved and the loss of prejudgment interest.
3. The Court of Appeals' holding that the pendency of counterclaims bars entry of final judgment under FRCP 54(b) absent
"unusual or harsh circumstances" amounts to a virtual per se
barrier not contemplated by the rule.
For Respondent, General Electric:
1. FRCP 54(b) permits an exception to the strong policy
against piecemeal entries of final judgment and appeals only in
"infrequent harsh cases."
2. Mere disparity between the statutory rate of prejudgment interest and the prevailing interest rate in the market place characterizes all damage suits and does not make this suit an "infrequent harsh case."
3. The existence of substantial counterclaims is a factor properly considered as weighing against the entry of final judgment
under FRCP 54(b).

state and subject to withdrawal from the federal domain. Since
1894, Idaho has received approximately 600,000 acres of land
under the Act. In 1974, Idaho requested pursuant to the Act that
the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary") temporarily withdraw
a specified tract of 27,400 acres of desert land in Idaho pending
submission of a plan of proposed development for irrigation and
reclamation. In January 1975, the Department of Interior's
Bureau of Land Management ("Department") rejected Idaho's
application for temporary withdrawal since the land sought by the
state had already been withdrawn for other purposes. One month
later, Idaho filed the present action against the Secretary, alleging
that he violated the Act and notified the State that he did not
agree that the State had a vested right under the Carey Act to
three million acres of desert land, and that he had the authority to
refuse to convey lands under the Act even though they are in fact
desert lands and suitable for agricultural use.
The district court held that a state had no absolute right to
select any particular desert lands for Carey Act reclamation, but
also concluded that the Act gave Idaho a right of entitlement to
three million acres of desert land suitable for irrigation, cultivation, and settlement. In light of this general entitlement, the Secretary was under a statutory obligation to preserve enough desert
land suitable for Carey Act development. The Secretary appealed
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Background and Significance
The Carey Act was an attempt by the federal government to entice the states into reclaiming, cultivating, and settling theretofore
valueless desert lands - lands that would not yield an agriculContinued on page 4
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Continued from page 3
tural crop without irrigation - in return for transfer of the reclaimed land to the state. Subsequent amendments raised the
maximum acreage allowed Idaho under the Act from one million
to three million, and the limitations for Colorado, Nevada, and
Wyoming to two million acres.
No state has yet been granted the statutory maximum acreage
alloted to it. To date, Idaho has received approximately 600,000
acres of land under the Act. Most federal grants of desert land
under the Act took place in the early years of this century. The
lands initially reclaimed were generally those with easiest access to
irrigation water sources. As accessible water resources became
more scarce, state interest in Carey Act projects dwindled until
the early 1950's, when they were virtually nonexistent. Recent
technological developments in water pumping and conveyance led
to renewed state interest in Carey Act projects.
This case is one of first impression because it turns wholly on a
question of statutory interpretation: What precisely was the scope
of the largesse granted the states by Congress in the Carey Act?
The case is significant because of its impact on federal land-management programs. If the lower court decision is affirmed, the
western states involved will have an unlimited amount of time to
decide whether and where to initiate a Carey Act project. Several
million acres will have to be identified by the Secretary as desert
land suitable for Carey Act development, and to what extent this
land will be available for other uses in the absence of state requests for withdrawal is subject to conjecture. An affirmance of
the lower court could thus mean considerable planning and landmanagement problems in the federal administration of its public
lands in the West. A reversal of the lower court, on the other

hand, would indicate unequivocally that the Secretary has broad
discretion in deciding whether to authorize Carey Act reclamation
projects or to utilize desert lands for purposes consistent with
other legislative programs such as the Desert Land Act, 43 U.S.C.
section 321, and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976, 43 U.S.C. section 1713(b). How the Court resolves this case
will turn on its interpretation of the statute and congressional intent.
Arguments
For Petitioner,Secretary of the Interior:
1. The plain language and the legislative history of the Act
show that it established no state entitlement to public lands in the
federal domain.
2. The contemporaneous construction of the Act by the
Secretary, as set forth in Department regulations and subsequent
legislative history, demonstrates that no state entitlement to
public lands was intended.
3. The authority relied on by the district court was not on point
and clearly does not support the lower court's decision.
For Respondent, State of Idaho:
1. The express language of the Act grants federal lands to
Idaho.
2. The legislative history of the Act reveals that Congress intended to grant and donate lands to the states conditioned only on
the states' reclamation and settlement of the lands.
3. Federal and state courts have continually found that the Act
constituted a conditional grant to the states.
4. The original Carey Act regulations promulgated by the Department are consistent with Idaho's position.
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